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SOME PEITY COMPLAINTS ABOUT
ARTICLE THREE
James J. White*
I N many ways Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code
(Code) is like a huge machine assembled by a mad inventor and
comprised of assorted sprockets, gears, levers, pulleys, and belts. Few
thoroughly understand all of the jobs which this machine is to per-
form; and a search through the reported cases suggests that the ma-
chine is either performing so efficiently that it commits no mistakes
worth litigating or it is not performing at all.1
In their study of the intricacies of Article Three, law students
resemble persons climbing about on the machine-pulling its levers,
testing its belts and pulleys, and trying the motor. At first they are
baffled by it; then they are intrigued by the complementary relation-
ships among the various working parts which become apparent only
upon close examination. They see that the inventor was far from
mad, yet they are frustrated because they cannot see the machine in
action to find out whether the gears and belts, which look as if they
might not function properly, can, in fact, perform as planned. The
discussion that follows will point out some places where the design
looks defective. None of my complaints are fundamental; each is
petty at least in the sense that no cases have yet manifested difficulty
in the operation of the machine. Indeed, the words that follow may
be simply one more person's pulling on the levers and poking at the
innards of the machine.
I. "HOLDER" UNDER THE CODE
"Holder" is one of the most important terms of art used in Article
Three of the Code. It is the basis of the "holder in due course" chassis
and it is an important part of other less significant conceptual struc-
tures.2 In most cases one has little difficulty in determining whether
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1956, Amherst College;
J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 60, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to David R. Johnson, a 1966 graduate
of the University of Michigan Law School, and to Eric Schaal, a second-year student
in the University of Michigan Law School, for their assistance in the preparation of
this article.
I. To and including January 1, 1967, the U.C.C. Reporting Service has reported
approximately 120 cases that arose in federal and state appellate courts under Article
Three.
2. Some of these other less significant conceptual situations are found in U.C.C.
§ 3-603 (payment to a holder discharges the payor's liability); § 3-407 (holder's
fraudulent and material alteration causes discharge but a nonholder's action has no
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a person is a holder. There are at least two requirements which must
be satisfied: he must have possession of the negotiable instrument
and, when he received it, the instrument must have had certain
words written upon its face or upon its face and reverse side3-words
making it either a bearer instrument or payable to the order of the
holder.
One ambiguity is whether there is a third requirement, namely
that one have acquired possession by the process of "delivery." The
Code defines delivery as a "voluntary transfer" 4 and if such a delivery
is necessary, no thief can be a holder. A second ambiguity is whether
one making an indorsement must himself be a holder (or a holder's
representative) in order to endow his transferee with the status of
holder. Thus, if a thief is not a holder himself because he fails to
meet any of the foregoing requirements, does it follow that no person
who claims through his indorsement can be a holder?
A. The Delivery Requirement
The only person who will commonly come into possession of a
negotiable instrument except by a voluntary transfer is a thief.5 It is
elementary that a thief will not be permitted either to retain the pro-
ceeds from a stolen instrument or to sue on such an instrument, with-
out regard to whether he successfully describes himself as a holder.0
such consequences); § 3-413 and § 3-414 (the drawer and indorser engaged to pay only
"holders or indorsers"); § 3-504 (presentment can be made only "by or on behalf of the
holder').
Except where otherwise indicated, all references herein are to sections in and com-
ments to the 1962 version of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
3. Presumably one who takes an instrument which is incomplete on its face and
completes it according to his authority is a holder of the instrument so completed. See
U.C.C. § 3-115 and comment 3 to § 3-305. This seems to be the only exception to the
rule that an instrument must have certain words on its face or on its face and reverse
side at the time of the transfer for the transferee to qualify as a holder. One who is
not a holder for the want of such words cannot transform himself into a holder merely
by altering the instrument. Although the Code nowhere explicitly states such a rule,
§ 1-201(20) should be read to incorporate the pre-Code law which was to that effect. See
notes 52 and 53 infra. Moreover, to give a nonbaolder the power to make himself into
a holder by his own alteration would be inconsistent with §§ 3-407 (alteration) and
3-404 (unauthorized signatures), as well as with the general Code policy of affording
protection to the obligors of order paper.
4. U.C.C. § 1-201(14).
5. Of course transfers of negotiable instruments by trustees in bankruptcy, in
connection with sheriff's sales, and in other such instances, may be classified as in-
voluntary. Whether the drafters intended these transfers to be so classified is not dear.
Section 3-302(3)(a) contemplates that a person taking at a judicial sale or under legal
process be a holder, but it gives no clue as to whether such taking should be deemed
a voluntary transfer.
6. Irrespective of his status as a holder, the thief will be guilty of conversion and
will be obliged to repay the owner. The owner's right against the thief arises not from
[Vol. 65:1315
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Therefore, the examination of the thief's status is important only
because the rights and liabilities of subsequent transferees of the
thief as well as other parties will sometimes depend upon whether
the thief is a holder. Three situations illustrate this point:
(I) A dismissed employee steals a payroll check which had
been made payable to his order. Whether the loss falls on his
employer or on the thief's transferee will sometimes depend
upon whether the thief is classified as a holder.7
(2) A thief steals a bearer check from the owner's hands and
procures payment directly from the drawee bank. Whether the
loss rests upon the drawee bank or on the owner from whom it
was stolen will sometimes depend upon whether the thief is a
holder.8
(3) A thief steals a $500 bearer check and raises the amount
to $1,500. It is likely that $1,000 of the loss will ultimately come
to rest upon the thief's immediate transferee, but whether that
transferee or some other person will bear the other $500 loss will
sometimes depend upon whether the thief is a holder."
In each of the above hypothetical cases, the thief satisfies the "words"
as well as the possession requirements and fails to be a holder, if at
all, only because he does not take by delivery.
In the search for a delivery requirement, consider first section
1-201(20), the general definition of "holder": "'Holder' means a
person who is in possession of a document of title or an instrument
or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his
order or to bearer or in blank." This definition contains no explicit
reference to delivery or other voluntary transfer, but its three verbs-
"drawn, issued or indorsed"-may incorporate such a term. "Issue"
is defined in section 3-102(l)(a) which states that it is "the first de-
the Code but from the common law as incorporated by § 1-103. Although § 3-419 does
deal with the conversion liability of certain persons, it is most unlikely that the Code
drafters intended to extinguish the common law liability of the thief by their codifica-
tion of the bank's responsibility in § 3-419. See U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) and Naw YoRK
LAW REVISION CoMrM'N, 2 REP RT ON ThM UNIFORM CoMM. CODE [320] (1082) (1955).
7. See notes 27 and 28 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 29 and 30 infra and accompanying text.
9. Subsequent transferees of the altered instrument can transfer at least $1,000 of
the loss to the thief's transferee on the basis of the latter's breach of his warranty
concerning alteration under § 3-417. Unless he can recover from the thief, this $1,000
loss will rest with the thief's transferee.
The question whether the other $500 of the loss will rest on the thief's transferee,
the drawer, or on another party is discussed in notes 31 and 32 infra and accompanying
text.
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livery.. ." of an instrument.10 "Indorse" is defined only indirectly
under section 3-202(2)" which contains no requirement of delivery.
"Draw" is not defined in the Code, and the principal question is
whether a delivery requirement is implicit in the word.
A comparison of the status of a thief of a bearer check with that
of a thief of a bearer note suggests why one might imply such a re-
quirement. If "drawing" is no more than a drawer's act of signing
the check, the check thief is a holder, for he is one in possession of an
instrument "drawn, issued or indorsed" to bearer. But the same is
not true of the thief of the bearer note. The note has not been
"issued" since there has been no delivery, and it has not been "in-
dorsed." It is difficult to say that the note has been "drawn" to bearer
because "draw" is used elsewhere in the Code to refer only to drafts;
indeed the authors of the Code have carefully distinguished "draw-
ing" a draft from "making" a note and have consistently used both
words when they intended to refer to both items.' 2 The note thief
therefore does not fit comfortably under any of the three verbs in
section 1-201 and consequently appears to be a nonholder. This logic
leads to the conclusion that the thief who makes one dip into the
cash drawer is a holder of the bearer checks he comes up with, but is
a nonholder as to any bearer notes he retrieves. Surely, there is no
reason for so distinguishing between these two cases, especially when
one considers the effect which this arbitrary classification will have
for the parties to these two kinds of instruments. The two cases can
be harmonized either by reading a delivery requirement into the
term "draw" or by stretching "draw" so as to include the act of
making a note and not reading in a delivery requirement. Under the
former approach the check thief would claim under the verb "draw"
and the note thief would claim under the verb "issue"; neither
would be a holder since each would lack the required delivery.
Under the latter approach both would claim under "draw," and both
would be holders. Thus, if one is to avoid indefensible results under
section 1-201(20) itself, he must either imply a delivery requirement
in the verb "draw" or he must use that word in a way in which it is
not used elsewhere in the Code.
The question would be simple enough if section 1-201(20) were
10. This definition is explicitly applicable only to Article Three, but there is no
reason to believe that the drafters of the Code would have intended "issue" to mean
one thing where it appears in Article Three and another thing in § 1-201(20) as that
section is applied to Article Three transactions.
11. For a discussion of the question whether § 3-202(2) provides a definition of the
verb "indorse," see text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
12. See, e.g., §§ 3-413, 3-417, & 3-405.
[Vol. 65:1315
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the only relevant section. However, section 3-202(1)13 (concerning
"negotiation") also bears upon the question of who is a holder; its
first sentence states that "[N]egotiation is the transfer of an instru-
ment in such form that the transferee becomes a holder." This sen-
tence can be read in two ways: it might mean that negotiation is the
only way of becoming a holder; or it might mean only that negotia-
tion is one of the ways in which one becomes a holder. Comment I to
section 3-202 hints at the former interpretation by stating that nego-
tiation is "merely a special form of transfer the importance of which
lies entirely in the fact that it makes the transferee a holder as defined
in § 1-201" [Emphasis added]-a fair paraphrase of which might be:
"this section's purpose is to define 'holder.' " If one so construes the
first sentence of section 3-202 and the quoted comment to mean that
the process of negotiation is the exclusive method by which one be-
comes a holder, then he has a second and self-sufficient way of defin-
ing "holder." Unlike section 1-201(20), it contains no internal am-
biguity, for it explicitly requires a delivery for a negotiation to occur.
Whether the drafters of the Code intended negotiation to be the
exclusive method by which one becomes a holder is not clear. Under
the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), some courts held that the
initial transfer of an instrument was not a "negotiation" but only an
"issue"; 14 other courts held that it was a negotiation.' 5 One might
infer from the retention of the word "issue" in the Code that the
drafters did not intend to classify the original transfer of an instru-
ment as a negotiation, and the removal of the word "negotiation"
from the provisions dealing with holders in due course for the stated
purpose of enabling the payee to be a holder also lends support to
this interpretation.'0 If the drafters had intended to make the original
13. Section 3-202(1) reads as follows:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee
becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery.
14. See, e.g., Williamson v. Payne, 300 Ky. 161, 188 S.W.2d 96 (1945); Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953);
Britton Milling Co. v. Williams, 44 S.D. 464, 184 N.W. 265 (1921).
15. See, e.g., Macklin v. Macklin, 315 Mass. 451, 53 N.E.2d 86 (1944); First Nat'l
Bank v. Noble, 179 Ore. 26, 168 P.2d 854 (1946); cf. Kohler v. First National Bank, 157
Wash. 417, 289 Pac. 417 (1930).
16. Section 52 of the UNIwoRm NEGorALEmL INSTRUMENTs LAw [hereinafter cited as
N.I.L.] provided:
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions:
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity .... (Emphasis added.)
Comment 2 to § 3-302 states that the word "negotiated" in § 52(4) of the NIL has
caused "conflict over the status of the payee as a holder in due course," and that the
May 1967] 1319
HeinOnline  -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1319 1966-1967
Michigan Law Review
transfer a negotiation, removing the word from section 3-302 would
have been unnecessary. Furthermore, by adding a word or two in
section 3-202, the drafters easily could have made negotiation the
exclusive method of becoming a holder, but they did not do so. These
facts suggest that the drafters did not characterize the original trans-
fer as a negotiation, but nevertheless intended the first transferee to
be a holder; accordingly, they support the conclusion that negotia-
tion (with its attendant "delivery") is not the exclusive means by
which one can become a holder.
On the other hand, the second sentence of section 3-202(1) seems
to support the contrary conclusion. That sentence states: "If the in-
strument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any
necessary indorsement ...." (Emphasis added.) One can argue that
the drafters intentionally used the qualifying adjective "necessary"
and purposely deviated from the antecedent NIL language ("If pay-
able to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder com-
pleted by delivery") 17 in order to indicate that the original transfer
is a negotiation despite the absence of an indorsement. Unless the
original transfer is a negotiation, an indorsement is always necessary
for the negotiation of an order instrument to occur.18 If an indorse-
ment is always necessary, then the qualifying adjective is superflu-
ous;' 9 therefore, the argument goes, in order to give meaning to the
adjective "necessary," the original transfer must be a negotiation. It
does not necessarily follow from the fact that the drafters may have
expanded "negotiation" to include the original transfer (whose status
was doubtful under the NIL) as well as all other standard transfers
in which the transferee would be a holder, that they intended nego-
tiation to be the exclusive means of becoming a holder, but it makes
that conclusion possible, if not inviting.
Thus, one leaves section 3-202 unenlightened. As has been shown,
the section can be read as a second and self-contained definition of
the word "holder," which requires acquisition by delivery, and thus
word has been removed from § 3-302 to make it dear that a payee may be a holder in
due course.
If, as suggested above, the drafters intended to make negotiation the exclusive way
of being a holder by redefining it to include the original transfer, it would not have
been necessary to remove the word "negotiation" from § 3-302. Nevertheless, the
drafters may have done so out of an excess of caution.
17. N.I.L. § 30.
18. U.C.C. § 3-204(1).
19. The word "necessary" is not used to exclude bearer paper, for the quoted
clause deals only with order paper. Nor is the word needed to tell which indorsements
are proper and effective and which are not, for subsection (2) performs that function
by defining "indorsement."
[Vol. 65:13151320
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denies the status of holder to the thief. If that is so, section 3-202 is
in apparent conflict with section 1-201(20). On the other hand, sec-
tion 3-202 may be illustrative only and may not be intended to ex-
clude other processes by which one can become a holder.
A final provision in Article Three which relates to the require-
ment of a delivery is comment 3 to section 3-305. It states that non-
delivery of an instrument is a defense to an action on the instrument,
but that a holder in due course takes the instrument free from any
such defense.20 If one concludes that only a holder can effectively
indorse, and if delivery were required to make one a holder,21 it
would be impossible for the situation suggested by the comment ever
to arise with respect to an order instrument, namely: nondelivery of
an order instrument (as, for example, theft of it) followed by a trans-
fer to a person who is deemed a holder in due course of that instru-
ment.
22
The argument that this comment negates the existence of a deliv-
ery requirement can best be understood in the context of an example.
Assume that A draws a payroll check to the order of B but does not
deliver it. B steals the check and transfers it to C who takes for value
and without knowledge of the theft. The argument for the proposi-
tion that delivery from A to B is not a requirement for C's being a
holder is as follows: (1) comment 3 to section 3-305 contemplates the
possibility that C (bona fide purchaser) be a holder of the order in-
strument despite B's theft of it; (2) C (bona fide purchaser) can never
be the holder of an order instrument under section 1-201(20) unless
it is "indorsed" to him or his order; (3) only a holder can effectively
"indorse";2s (4) therefore B (the thief) must be a holder; (5) if
delivery is a requirement for becoming a holder, B (the thief) will
20. Section 3-305, comment 3, reads in part as follows:
"All defenses" includes nondelivery, conditional delivery or delivery for a
special purpose. Under this Article such nondelivery or qualified delivery is a
defense (Sections 3-306 and 3-307) and the defendant has the full burden of
establishing it. Accordingly the "conclusive presumption" of the third sentence
of the original Section 16 is abrogated in favor of a rule of law cutting off the
defense.
The effect of this section, together with the sections dealing with incomplete
instruments (§ 3-115) and alteration (§ 3-407) is to cut off the defense of non-
delivery of an incomplete instrument against a holder in due course ....
21. A necessary premise for the statement is that a nonholder of order paper lacks
the power to convert it into bearer paper. For a discussion of a nonholder's power to
change his own status by alteration see note 3 supra.
22. A similar ambiguity existed under the NIL. Section 16 contained the following
language: "Where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid
delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is con-
clusively presumed." If delivery is a prerequisite to being a holder, how can one become
a holder in due course and so raise the conclusive presumption?
23. See notes 33-47 infra and accompanying text.
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never be a holder; (6) therefore delivery is not a requirement for one
to be a holder.
The weakness in the foregoing logic lies in statement (1)-the
conclusion that the comment contemplates an order instrument.
Perhaps the comment refers only to bearer and incomplete instru-
ments.24 If so, there is no logical inconsistency in finding that the
thief is a nonholder due to a lack of delivery and concluding that a
subsequent transferee is a holder, because the transferee of a bearer
instrument depends only upon possession, not "indorsement," to
become a holder. A nonholder may not be able to "indorse," but he
is able to deliver possession. However, this rejoinder-reading the
comment as applicable only to bearer situations-is not entirely con-
vincing. On its face, the comment is not limited to bearer instruments
and thus could be read to apply to subsequent transferees of stolen
order instruments.25 Indeed, the drafters may have been thinking
specifically of the stolen payroll check case.
The foregoing probing of sections 1-201 and 3-202, and the com-
ment to section 3-305 leaves one in a state of exasperation and con-
fusion.26 On its face section 1-201(20) appears not to require a deliv-
ery for one to become a holder, yet if "issue" is to apply at all and if
it is to have the definition which it has elsewhere in Article Three,
24. Comment 5 to § 8-115 suggests that the drafters had incomplete instruments
in mind:
A holder in due course sees and takes the same paper, whether it was complete
when stolen or completed afterward by the thief, and in each case he relies in
good faith on the maker's signature. The loss should fall on the party whose
conduct in signing blank paper has made the fraud possible, rather than upon
the innocent purchaser. The result is consistent with the theory of decisions
holding the drawer of a check stolen and afterwards filled in to be estopped
from setting up the nondelivery against an innocent party.
25. Another portion of the comment dealing with the unavailability of "conditional
delivery" as a defense against a holder in due course is equally applicable to order
as to bearer paper. Holders in due course of order paper successfully defeated the
conditional delivery argument in each of the following pre-Code cases: Husseyni v.
Rappaport, 127 F. Supp. 144 (D. Minn. 1954); Colonial Discount Co. v. Sebel, 19
N.YS.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Early v. Citizens Bank, 173 Va. 436, 3 S.E.2d 167 (1939).
26. It should be noted that § 3-306 may also be relevant to our inquiry about the
thief's status. One can argue that the language of § 3-306(d) implies that a thief can
be a holder:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instru-
ment subject to
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument
acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder
would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement.
... (Emphasis added.)
The argument would be as follows: The term "such holder" refers to "a person"
who "acquired [the instrument] by theft"--that is, a thief. However, consideration of
comment 5 to § 3-306 together with §§ 3-603 and 3-306 suggests that "such holder"
does not have reference to a thief, but to any holder who has taken under a restrictive
indorsement. The confusion results from the poor sentence structure in § 3-306(d).
1322 [Vol. 65:1315
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there would be a requirement for a delivery as to any person who
claims under the "issue" language. Section 3-202 requires a delivery
for a negotiation, but it is unclear whether the drafters intended
negotiation to be the exclusive method by which one could become
a holder. The comment to section 3-305 suggests that one can be a
holder despite the fact that he took without delivery, but not even
that is completely clear.
Faced with this mess, a judge will be free to do as he pleases. To
determine what he should do, consider again the three problem situ-
ations suggested above:
(1) A dismissed employee steals the payroll check which was made
out to his order but which was never delivered to him. The check
itself will give no clue that it was not delivered or that it is different
in any respect from the other payroll checks which the employee may
have been properly receiving and cashing during a course of employ-
ment. If one follows the apparent Article Three scheme of allocating
loss to the person with the greatest power to prevent recurrence of
the loss, it is appropriate to use the analogy of section 3-405 in the
padded payroll case and place the loss on the drawer-employer .2  To
do so, the thief must be held to be a holder.28
(2) In the second case a thief of a bearer instrument procures pay-
ment directly from the drawee bank or the maker. If the instrument
had instead been passed by the thief to a bona fide purchaser who
then presented it to the bank or maker, payment to the purchaser as
27. Apparently because of the employer's ability to prevent payroll padding and
because of his fault at failing to do so, the drafters have decided that the loss should
be placed on him when paychecks are issued to fictitious employees. See the first
paragraph of comment 4 to § 3-405:
4. Paragraph (c) is new. It extends the rule of the original Subsection 9(3)
to include the padded payroll cases, where the drawer's agent or employee
prepares the check for signature or otherwise furnishes the signing officer with
the name of the payee. The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon
the employer as a risk of his business enterprise rather than upon the subsequent
holder or drawee. The reasons are that the employer is normally in a better
position to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or supervision
of his employees, or, if he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the loss
by fidelity insurance; and that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense
of his business rather than of the business of the holder or drawee.
28. If the payee's signature in the stolen payroll case is treated as a forgery, then
the loss will ultimately rest upon the person who cashed the check, on account of his
warranty or indorsement liability. This is so because, if the thief and his transferees
are not holders, the payment to them will not cause discharge of the indorsement
contracts under § 3-603.
However, if the thief is held to be a holder, payment by the drawer through the
drawee will be a discharge under § 3-603. Then, under § 3-601(3)(b), the bank's pay-
ment would also discharge the liability of any indorsee who "cashed" the check and the
loss would rest on the employer or his insurer. To achieve the result of placing the
loss on the employer in this case it will also be necessary to find that the one pre-
senting the instrument for payment has "good title" under § 3-417(1)(a) and thus does
not breach his warranty under that section.
May 1967]1 1323
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a holder would have discharged the instrument and the underlying
liability, and would have left the loss on the one from whom the
check was stolen.29 Such a result would reflect the policy that bearer
instruments are first cousins of cash and should receive similar treat-
ment. There is no reason why the same result should not follow if the
bank or maker pays the thief instead of the thief's transferee. When
the thief himself procures payment, the policy is the same and neither
the culpability of the payor nor that of the thief's victim, nor the
ability of either of them to prevent recurrence, differs from the case
in which the instrument passes through one more set of hands before
payment. To achieve this result, the thief must again be held to be a
holder, for only payment to a holder so discharges the obligation
under section 3-603. If no such discharge is effected, the loss will
likely come to rest on the drawee of the check or the maker of the
note.80
(3) The third case is more difficult since here the thief has com-
mitted a "material and fraudulent" alteration by raising the check
from $500 to $1,500. If he is held to be a holder, his alteration has
the effect under section 3-407 of discharging all parties whose con-
tracts are altered from all claims except for those asserted by a "sub-
sequent holder in due course," who may enforce the instrument ac-
cording to its original tenor. However, if the thief is not a holder,
this alteration causes no discharge of any party. It is here desirable
that the thief not be held to be a holder so that the parties will be
held to their original obligations and so that a result similar to that
achieved under the spoliation doctrine might be obtained. The
"spoliation" doctrine, a traditional exception to the general rule that
alteration causes discharge, was designed to prevent unwarranted
discharges and windfalls which could result from such discharges.8 1
29. The transferee of a stolen bearer instrument can and often will be a holder in
due course. Moreover he will have "good title." Thus payment made to him will
discharge the liabilities on the instrument under § 3-603, and he will not be in breach
of any of the presentment warranties under § 3-417. The discharge on the instrument
also discharges any underlying obligation. U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(b). This will serve to
throw the loss back upon the person from whom the instrument was stolen.
30. Because the item will not be "properly payable" (§ 4-401), the drawee bank
will not be permitted to charge the drawer's account and the loss will rest upon the
bank. For cases holding that a drawee bank may not charge the drawer's account for
payments to nonholders at least in forgery cases, see Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home
Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919); Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Edgerly,
121 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1960); Wormhoudt Lumber Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 231
Iowa 928, 2 N.W.2d 267 (1942); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201
Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909). Except for the foregoing cases, a search did not disclose
cases dealing with the explicit question whether payment to a nonholder was "proper."
31. In Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 53, 52 Pac. 115, 117 (1898), the court gives the
rationale of the spoliation doctrine as follows:
The general rule undoubtedly is, as contended for by appellant, that any
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Thus, in order to reach the most desirable results under the pres-
ent language of the Code, the courts would have to make the thief
into a holder in the case of the stolen payroll check and in the case
of payment to the thief presenting a bearer instrument, but it would
have to find him a nonholder in the alteration case. Under the pres-
ent language of the Code, there is no satisfactory escape from this
unpleasant inconsistency. Moreover, there are no cases or other data
to indicate with certainty which of the three problems most warrants
attention and solution. Absent such data, I would suggest that the
courts find that delivery is not necessary for one to become a holder.
This would facilitate satisfactory outcomes in the first two situations
since the thieves could then be holders. Many, if not most, of the
cases in which an instrument is altered by a thief can be satisfactorily
resolved by a proper reading of section 3-201, irrespective of the
thief's status.32 To the extent that such cases cannot be resolved in
material alteration in the contract avoids it, even in the hands of innocent holders,
and prevents recovery upon it to any extent. But this rule has application to
cases where such alteration has been made by the payee or party seeking to
enforce it. By the later authorities the rule does not apply in cases where the
alteration is by a stranger to the contract, and it is now the settled doctrine, in this
country at least, that such an act by a stranger, without the privity of the grantee
or obligee, does not avoid the contract in its entirety, even though it be without
the knowledge or consent of the party to be bound, but amounts to a spoliation
merely, which will not prevent a recovery upon the contract in accordance with its
original terms, where those terms can be ascertained. And this is obviously upon
the principle that the act of a mere interloper without the privity of the parties
should not be permitted to defeat a contract to the extent that it would other-
wise be valid and binding. (See Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 214, where the
authorities are fully collated.) And an agent without authority is in this sense
held to be a stranger to the transaction....
For other cases which apply the spoliation doctrine see Andrews v. Calloway, 50
Ark. 358, 7 S.W. 449 (1887); Bercot v. Velkoff, 111 Ind. App. 323, 41 N.E.2d 686 (1942);
Francis v. Hughes, 217 Miss. 377, 64 So. 2d 351 (1953); Cooper v. Hembree, 194 Okla.
465, 152 P.2d 695 (1944).
It is clear from comment 3(a) to § 3-407 that the drafters of the Code explicitly
accepted the spoliation doctrine:
A material alteration does not discharge any party unless it is made by the
holder. Spoliation by any meddling stranger does not affect the rights of the
holder. It is of course intended that the acts of the holder's authorized agent or
employee or of his confederates, are to be attributed to him.
If one is discharged from his liability on the instrument by § 3-407 or otherwise, § 3-802
provides that he is also discharged from the underlying obligation. Thus, if a person
pays for a purchase by giving an instrument which is lost, found, and altered by the
finder, and if such alteration caused a discharge, the purchaser would have perfectly
good merchandise for which he did not have to pay and the seller would have no cause
of action against anyone except perhaps the finder. The error in completely discharging
the drawer in this circumstance is dear.
32. If § 3-201 were read to give each transferee of the subsequent holder in due
course the same rights the subsequent holder in due course has, then any earlier party
could pay the subsequent holder in due course and, by assuming his "special subse-
quent holder in due course" status, could sue earlier parties despite the alteration.
This reading of § 3-201 would produce a fair result in all cases except those in which
there was no such subsequent holder in due course. If, for example, parties subsequent
to the alteration did not become holders in due course because they were put on notice
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this manner, a court could quite properly redefine "holder" for the
purposes of section 3-407 so as to exclude a thief on the theory that
the drafters of the Code intended such a result when they incorpor-
ated the spoliation doctrine into that section.
The undesirability of so defining one word in two different ways
is obvious and the suggested solution is therefore merely an interim
answer. The ultimate solution of the difficulties caused by the am-
biguity in the definition of "holder" and the harmonizing of the vari-
ous Code sections lies in a revision of the Code.
B. Indorsement by Whom
A second ambiguity in the Code's definition of "holder" is
whether one who is neither a holder nor a holder's agent but who
nevertheless has possession of an order instrument can ever endow
his transferee with the status of holder. This question will usually
arise when an order instrument has been stolen and transferred.33
In such a case, the thief's transferee will probably satisfy the posses-
sion and "words" requirement of section 1-201(20), for the thief will
have delivered possession and will have placed the appropriate words
on the reverse side of the instrument. The transferee will also satisfy
any delivery requirement that may exist, for the thief will have vol-
untarily transferred the instrument to him. If the transferee fails to
be a holder under section 1-201(20), therefore, it must be only be-
cause the instrument has not been "indorsed" to him or his order.3 4
The definition sections in Articles One and Three contain no
by the alteration itself, then they could not sue even as to the original tenor and the
entire loss would rest upon the thief's immediate transferee (if recovery could not be
had from the thief).
A slightly different analysis of § 3-201 in the context of the alteration problem dis-
cussed in the text has been put forth in a student note. See 19 OKLA L. Rxv. 179
(1966). There it was suggested that a subsequent holder in due course of an altered
instrument under § 3-407 can select one among a group composed of prior indorsees
and the drawer and, by suing the one he chooses, cause the loss to remain on that one.
However, implicit in this approach is the assumption that the alteration has discharged
all parties except with respect to one suit by the one specific subsequent holder; this
overlooks the effect of § 3-201, which states that any transferee has the same rights as
his transferor.
33. In such cases the thief will usually fail to be a holder himself because of the
"words" requirement, that is, the document will be payable to the order of another,
not payable to his order. Moreover, if delivery is a sine qua non to the status of holder,
all thieves will also fail to be holders because of the lack of delivery.
34. In these cases we are concerned with the second and subsequent transfers of
an instrument. By definition the verb "issue" is limited to the initial transfer. Although
"draw" is not defined, it apparently refers to the "drawer's" act of signing (and perhaps
delivering) a "draft," and does not refer to any subsequent transfer of a draft. There-
fore, the only word left in § 1-201(20) upon which a person in our hypothetical can
rely in order to be a holder is "indorsed."
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definition of "indorse" or "indorsement."3 5 The nearest thing to a
definition of "indorsement" is found in section 3-202(2), which pro-
vides that an indorsement must be written "by or on behalf of a
holder."36 If that section defines "indorse" as it is used in section
1-201(20), then the transferee of an instrument who traces his title
through the purported indorsement of a nonholder (thief or other-
wise) is not a holder, for such a signature is not an "indorsement"
within the meaning of the Code. Since each successive transferee
fails to be a "holder" for want of an "indorsement," he also lacks the
power to "indorse" under the Code and so fails to make his transferee
a holder.
If section 3-202(2) provides the definition of "indorsement" and
"indorse," one can properly ask why it is not appropriately captioned
and placed in one of the definitional sections of the Code.ar One can
also argue, that section 3-202(2) defines only those "indorsements"
necessary for negotiation to occur, and as argued above, that negotia-
tion is not the exclusive method by which one becomes a holder.
However, even if a court were persuaded by these arguments that
section 3-202(2) is not a general definition which limits the
power of "indorsement" to holders and their representatives, the
court would not likely find a standard forger's transferee to be a
holder. The logic of the Code dictates such a result, for making the
forger's transferee a holder would give him the power to cause dis-
charge under section 3-603 by procuring payment and to assume the
rights of a holder in due course under section 3-305. This would
throw the various parts of the Article Three machine quite out of
harmony with one another-for instance, the bank's payment would
at one and the same time be a discharge of its obligation and a con-
version.38 Certainly the drafters did not intend such an occurrence. 39
35. The definitional section in article 1 is § 1-201; that in article 3 is § 3-102.
36. Section 3-202(2) reads as follows: "An indorsement must be written by or on
behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to
become a part thereof."
37. This particular arrangement of § 3-202 probably stems from the fact that it was
patterned after an NIL provision which had similar words arranged under a "negotia-
tion" heading. N.I.L. §§ 30-32. Moreover, the need for a separate definition may never
have occurred to the drafters, for the courts had no trouble under the NIL denying a
recovery to a forger's transferee. See, e.g., United States v. Lemons, 67 F. Supp. 985
(1946); Berger v. Georgia Power Co., 77 Ga. App. 672, 49 S.E.2d 668 (1948); Buena
Vista Loan & Say. Bank v. Stockdale, 56 Ga. App. 168, 192 S.E. 246 (1937); Fidelity Nat'l
Bank v. Vuci, 224 La. 123, 68 So. 2d 781 (1953); Hellman v. Cornett, 137 Va. 200, 119 S.E.
74 (1923).
38. Section 3-419(1)(a) states that one converts an instrument if he pays "on a forged
indorsement," yet § 3-603 states that one's obligation is discharged by payment to a
holder.
39. See comment 3 to § 8-417 and § 3-419.
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There is, however, one quite elegant forgery situation in which
a court might be tempted to find the forger's signature sufficient to
make his transferee a holder. This is the so-called Wells Fargo situa-
tion,40 in which a thief steals an order check, replaces the payee's
name with his own or otherwise alters it, procures the drawee's
acceptance, and then passes the check to a purchaser for value who
presents it for payment. Under the NIL, two courts4' held that the
accepting bank had to pay the presenter despite the fact that he traced
his title through a thief, and, in dictum, both of these courts found
that the presenter was a holder in due course.42 Comment 5 to section
3-417 of the Code cites both of these cases and states that section 3-417
is intended to produce the same results.43 It purports to do so by
creating an exception to a standard presenter's warranty which would
otherwise throw the loss back on the presenter.44 However, this ex-
ception, necessary to produce the Wells Fargo outcome, applies only
to a presenter who is a "holder in due course." If the presenter is not
a holder in due course, he does not get the benefit of the exception;
he thus makes the warranty that the instrument has not been altered,
and the loss may be thrown back upon him by the bank on grounds
of breach of his warranty against alteration. Thus, if a court is to
produce the Wells Fargo result under the Code in the way the draft-
ers suggested, it must make the presenter into a holder despite the
fact that he claims through a thief's signature.
40. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781
(1931). The inconsistency between the Wells Fargo outcome and § 3-417 of the Code has
been noted previously. See Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 MIcH. L. Rav. 255, 295-99 (1950); 32 TEMPLE LAw Q. 182, at
188-90 (1959).
41. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, supra note 40; National
City Bank v. National Bank, 300 111. 103, 132 N.E. 832 (1921).
42. In National City Bank v. National Bank, id. at 108, 132 N.E. at 833, the court
observed:
When appellant took the draft it was complete and regular on its face. It had been
duly accepted by the drawee. It was taken in good faith and for value, and
appellant then had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
title of the person negotiating it, and appellant was therefore a holder in due
course. It relied upon the general acceptance of appellee, and under the Negotiable
Instruments Law was protected by it.
See also Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 162, 4
P.2d 781, 784 (1931).
43. Comment 5 to § 3-417 reads as follows:
The exception made by subparagraph (iii) in the case of a holder in due
course of a draft accepted after the alteration follows the decisions in National
City Bank of Chicago... and Wells Fargo Bank ... and is based on the principle
that an acceptance is an undertaking relied upon in good faith by an innocent
party....
44. The exception mentioned in comment 5 is found in § 3-417(1)(c): "the instrument
has not been materially altered, except that this warranty is not given by a holder in
due course acting in good faith .... (Emphasis added.)
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For reasons discussed above, courts will not wish to make "hold-
ers" out of the transferees of mine run forgers; therefore, if courts are
to reach the Wells Fargo result, they must distinguish transferees of
checks carrying forged indorsements from transferees of checks on
which material alterations in the payees' names or otherwise have
occurred and on which the names (changed or not) have been "in-
dorsed." The takers of the latter instruments would be holders but
the takers of the former would not. However, this distinction between
transferees of forged checks and those of altered or altered and forged
checks is not supported by any apparent policy,45 and it is difficult to
justify under the language of the Code. The forger's transferee is not
a holder because he takes under the signature of a nonholder-thief
-one without power to "indorse" under section 1-201(20). But the
same is true of the transferee in the Wells Fargo situation, for there
the thief is a nonholder because the instrument is not payable to him
or his order-that is, he fails the "words" requirement-and he does
not transform himself into a holder, capable of indorsing, merely by
altering the payee's name.46
Therefore, in order to accomplish the drafters' intent in the Wells
Fargo situation with the least violence to the Code, a court might
choose to define "holder" as used in section 3-417 so as to include all
bona fide purchasers for value. This would cause the same unpleasant
result discussed above: it would leave "holder" meaning one thing
for most purposes (that is, one who does not claim through the in-
dorsement of a nonholder) and another thing for purposes of the ex-
ception in section 3-417 (that is, one who may claim through the in-
dorsement of a nonholder). Yet this is surely preferable to the chaos
which would follow from achieving the Wells Fargo result by retain-
ing a single definition of "holder," thereby making the transferees of
ordinary forgers into holders, and it has fewer undesirable side ef-
fects than the solution under section 3-413 which is described
below.47 The proper solution, no doubt, is to revise section 3-417
and add a definition of "indorse" to section 1-201.
45. The more favorable treatment given to transferees of altered checks cannot bejustified on the grounds that they are less at fault than are the transferees of forged
checks. If the forgery is done artfully (by forging the indorsement of the payee or last-
named indorsee and making the check payable to the thief's own name) the transferee
of the thief will not be able to discover the forgery by comparing the identification
of the thief with that of the last-named indorsee. Moreover, given the facts that an
altered check will always have been erased or changed in some way and that many
checks are written by special means on special paper, the transferee of altered paper
may ordinarily be more at fault in accepting the altered paper than is the transferee
of forged paper in accepting forged paper.
46. See note 3 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
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II. GooD TrrLiE
Section 3-417(1)(a) states that one presenting a negotiable instru-
ment for payment warrants that he has "good title" to the instru-
ment. There are two difficulties with the use of the words "good title"
in that section: (1) it tends to obscure the treatment which the Code
accords a holder in due course of a bearer instrument who traces his
title to the instrument through a thief; and (2) it places an additional
obstacle in the way of achieving the Wells Fargo outcome.
Under both the pre-NIL common law and the NIL, one who took
a bearer instrument in good faith and for value from a thief had
good title to the instrument.48 Presumably the Code drafters in-
tended to carry forward the same result.4 However, "good tide" is
not defined in the Code and one ignorant of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century case law devolopment is likely to come to the oppo-
site conclusion. In his ignorance of the specialized meaning of "good
title" for Bills and Notes purposes, he may apply the standard per-
sonal property rule that one acquires only a "void title" from a
thief.50 By using words already freighted with a meaning which is
contrary to that which they are intended to convey, the drafters have
incorporated an unnecessary ambiguity in section 3-417(1)(a). Since
the words can easily be replaced with more precise terms, the words
should be changed.
Second, the attempt to obtain the Wells Fargo result under sec-
tion 3-417 in the manner described above will be frustrated unless
the "good title" requirement of that section is also reinterpreted. The
presenter in Wells Fargo traced his title to an order instrument
through one who had stolen the instrument, altered the payee's name,
48. The statement that the transferee had "good title" in this context means at
least that he is not guilty of conversion by receiving payment on it and transferring it,
and that he has a right to payment on the instrument which he can demand and
enforce if necessary.
For cases holding that the taker of a bearer instrument from a thief has good title,
see Irwin v. Deming, 142 Iowa 299, 120 N.W. 645 (1909); Stricker v. Buncombe County,
205 N.C. 536, 172 S.E. 188 (1934); Texas Sporting Goods Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
81 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). These cases are some of the descendants of Miller
v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
49. The presumed intention to carry forward the same result comes from the
negative implication of comment 8 to § 3-417, which states that the purpose of the
good title language is to deal with the forgery situation. The presumption is further
supported by the absence of any language which suggests an intent to change the law.
Such a fundamental change should not be assumed without an explicit statement in
the Code or comments.
50. See U.C.C. § 2-403; BROWN, LAW or PRMONAL PROPERTY § 67, at 231-32 (2d ed.
1955). Although § 2-403(l) expands the voidable title concept to new transactions which
were not covered prior to the Code, it carries forward the basic rule that one acquires
only void title from a thief. Unless a thief acquired possession by some variety of
voluntary transfer he has only a void title under Article Two.
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procured acceptance by the drawee, and thereafter transferred by
purported indorsement to the presenter who took it in good faith
and for value. Does such a presenter have "good title" under section
3-417(1)(a)? If not, he will be in breach of his warranty of title. Com-
ment 3 to section 3-417 indicates that the section carries forward the
NIL and common law rule that one who traces title to an order in-
strument through a standard forged indorsement lacks "good title."51
The Wells Fargo presenter traces through a thief who, not being
content with a single forgery, first altered and then signed the payee's
name; thus he lacks the true payee's indorsement. At least one court
has expressly held, 52 and other courts have implicitly held,5 3 that one
who claims an order instrument through a thief who has not just
forged the payee's indorsement but who has first changed the payee's
name and then indorsed the changed name also lacks good title. In
the face of these cases and in the absence of any satisfactory policy
reason for finding "good title" in the Wells Fargo transferee and no
such title in the transferee of a mine-run forger, a court will have
difficulty reaching the Wells Fargo outcome under section 3-417
(1)(a).
An inviting escape from this dilemma in section 3-417 is to read
the acceptor bank's contract under sections 3-413(1) and 3-410(1) as
a promise to pay any good faith purchaser who presents any draft
which has been accepted in an altered form. This argument focuses
upon the acceptor's agreement to "pay according to the tenor at the
time of his engagement." At first reading this suggestion appears
commendable for its total avoidance of section 3-417's ambiguous
"holder" and "good title" language. Moreover, section 3-413 is a
lineal descendant of the NIL language which was the basis for the
National City Bank and Wells Fargo cases and therefore would seem
to be the most likely vehicle in the Code for dealing with the Wells
Fargo situation. However, the difficulty is that the drafters of the
Code did not intend such an interpretation; rather they intended
the performance of the drawee's acceptance contract under sections
51. Section 3-417, comment 3 states:
Subsection (1)(a) retains the generally accepted rule that the party who accepts
or pays does not "admit" the genuineness of indorsements, and may recover from
the person presenting the instrument when they turn out to be forged. The
justification for the distinction between forgery of the signature of the drawer and
forgery of an indorsement is that the drawee is in a position to verify the drawer's
signature by comparison with one in his hands, but has ordinarily no opportunity
to verify an indorsement.
52. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Bank of Louisiana, 167 So. 2d 383 (La.
App. 1964), writ refused, 247 La. 247, 170 So. 2d 508 (1965).
53. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Natl Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919);
Farmers Bank v. Bank of Abbeville, 29 Ga. App. 472, 116 S.E. 204 (1923); Andrews v.
Sibley, 220 Mass. 10, 107 N.E. 395 (1914).
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3413 and 3-410(1) to be conditioned upon the presenter's faithful
performance of his section 3417 good title and non-alteration war-
ranties. That is, the drafters contemplated that the acceptor would
agree, in effect, to "pay according to the original tenor but only to
one who does not breach the warranties of title and alteration." An
example will illustrate the drafters' intent: If a holder in due course
had taken a draft which had been altered prior to his taking, had it
accepted, and later himself presented it to the drawee bank for pay-
ment, section 3-417 is carefully drawn to place the loss upon him and
not upon the bank.54 Apparently the drafters intended to place the
loss on the presenter in such a case since there was no transfer of the
instrument after acceptance and therefore there was no transferee
who could be disappointed at the failure of the bank to comply with
what appeared to be an agreement to pay the instrument in its al-
tered form.5 5 The drafters went to considerable length to carve this
situation out of section 3417. Yet if one were to argue successfully
that sections 3-413 and 3410 provide that the drawee has agreed to
pay irrespective of the breach of the presenter's warranties under sec-
tion 3-417, the liability would be placed upon the bank whether the
bona fide purchaser who presents for payment took the instrument
before or after acceptance, and the drafters' efforts to treat these cases
differently would be frustrated. For that reason I conclude that the
acceptor's contract was intended to be read like a buyer's duty to pay
under a sales contract which has been conditioned upon the seller's
satisfactory performance of his warranties. If that be true, sections
3-413 and 3-410 do not solve the problem, for the acceptor in a Wells
Fargo situation need not perform his contract "to pay according to
the tenor at the time of his acceptance" if the presenter of the draft
has breached his section 3-417 title or alteration warranties. 50
54. For the exception to apply there must be a transfer after acceptance. The
relevant language in § 3-417(c)(iii) is as follows: "if the holder in due course took the
draft after the acceptance .... " (Emphasis added.)
55. Comment 5 to § 3-417 states the principle as follows:
Subparagraph (iii) accordingly provides that such language is not sufficient to
impose on the holder in due course the warranty of no material alteration where
the holder took the draft after the acceptance and presumably in reliance upon
it. (Emphasis added.)
56. There are at least two other possible escapes from the § 3417 dilemma. The
first is to treat the accepting bank as though it had issued a cashier's check when it
accepted the check in question. This amiable fiction would produce the Wells Fargo
outcome since one would ignore any alterations or forgeries which had occurred prior
to the acceptance. However, it would deviate from the intent of the drafters of the
code, for it would not limit recovery to holders in due course who had taken after
the acceptance. Also, it would permit recovery against the accepting bank when the
bank had accepted forged but unaltered paper, for it would cut off the accepting
bank's argument under § 3-417(l)(a).
The second solution involves § 3-413(3). That section provides that the acceptor
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Here, as above, the ultimate solution lies in redrafting section
3-417. The best interim answer, however, is to bend the "good title"
concept so as to include the Wells Fargo presenter.
III. REcovRY AGAINST THE DRAWER AND PRIOR INDORSERS ON
LOST OR STOLEN CHECKS
If an order check is stolen from the payee or indorsee, the Code
gives the aggrieved owner a right to recover from the drawee bank
if it pays the thief or his transferees.57 The aggrieved owner will also
have a right against the thief in conversion and he may have a right
to recover from certain parties intervening between the thief and
the drawee bank.58 But thieves are notoriously unpromising defen-
dants and the drawee bank may not be subject to the jurisdiction of
the local courts or it may not have paid on the instrument and may
"admits as against all subsequent parties ... the existence of the payee and his then
capacity to indorse." If one reads "payee" to refer to the one who presents the check
for acceptance and concludes that the admission of "capacity to indorse" estops the
acceptor bank from raising the flaw in the payee's title (he claims through a thief's
indorsement), he reaches the Wells Fargo result. Since the bank is estopped only as
to "subsequent parties," it can still raise the alteration and bad title defense against
the one who presented for acceptance. Thus this solution is superior to the im-
mediately foregoing one, for it permits the bank to defeat the party who presented for
acceptance but requires it to pay those who take the check after acceptance.
This solution too would go slightly beyond the drafters' goal, for it would estop
the accepting bank in the forgery as well as the alteration case. However, the real
difficulty with this solution is that it probably misconstrues the words "capacity to
indorse." The comment indicates that this portion of § 3-413 was enacted with the
intention of making "no change in substance from the revisions of the original act."
Cases under the NIL used the "existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse"
language to estop the maker of a note from arguing that his payee's indorsement was
ultra vires or that the payee was an infant or otherwise incompetent. See, e.g., Iowa
Fed'n of Women's Clubs v. Dilley, 234 Iowa 417, 12 N.W.2d 815 (1944) (ultra vires
transfer); Ingle Sys. Co. v. Norris, 132 Tenn. 472, 178 S.W. 1113 (1915) (maker estopped
to deny corporation's existence). The phrase thus went to his legal capacity to make a
contract, not to his status as a holder or nonholder. If the words have the same
meaning in the Code as they had under the NIL, § 3-413(3) is inapplicable to the
Wells Fargo case.
57. Section 3-419(l)(c).
58. For a discussion of the thief's liability, see note 6 supra.
Under the common law the owner had a cause of action against transferees who
had possession of the check between the thief and the drawee bank. See, e.g., Merchants'
Bank v. National Capital Press, Inc., 53 App. D.C. 59, 288 Fed. 265 (1923); United States
Portland Cement Co. v. United States Natl Bank, 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202 (1916);
Central Trust Co. v. Backsman, 50 Ohio App. 512, 198 N.E. 730 (1935); Henderson v.
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1950). Section 3-419(3) re-
moves this liability from one who is a "representative, including a depository or collect-
ing bank," who deals with the check in good faith, and who does not retain any
proceeds. Thus banks in the collecting chain will usually have no liability for dealing
with a stolen check [But see Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473
(1965)]; there is some doubt, however, as to whether "representative" includes merchants
and others who simply cash a check over a forged indorsement or whether the term
is limited to banks in the chain of payment.
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thus be innocent of conversion. In such cases the aggrieved owner's
interest will likely turn to the drawer and to any prior indorsers of
the check. The two Code provisions directly relevant to these causes
of action are sections 3-802 and 3-804.59
At the outset, the aggrieved owner will find that section 3-802
prevents his suing on any underlying obligation which may have
existed between him and the drawer or prior indorser. Section 3-802
provides that the giving of a personal check suspends the underlying
obligation "pro tanto until the instrument is due or if it is payable
on demand until its presentment." [Emphasis added.] Since the
owner will not have possession of the check because it will have been
stolen, he cannot "present" it6O and therefore it will not be in his
power to end by presentment section 3-802's suspension of the under.
lying obligation.
Section 3-804 appears to provide some relief in the payee or in-
dorsee-owner's case. That section gives the owner a right to sue and
recover on lost or stolen instruments against "any party liable" on
the instrument.61 The question then becomes: Who are the "parties
liable" on the stolen check? If the item were a note, clearly the maker
of the note would be "liable" on his contract under section 3-413(1).2
Presumably the drafters intended that the drawer and prior indors-
ers were also "parties liable," but there is a difficulty here. The maker
59. Section 3-802 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying
obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or
acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument
against the underlying obligor; and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instru-
ment is due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment. If the
instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on either the
instrument or the obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on
the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
(2) The taking in good faith of a check which is not postdated does not of
itself so extend the time on the original obligation as to discharge a surety.
Section 3-804 provides:
The owner of an instrument which is lost, whether by destruction, theft or
otherwise, may maintain an action in his own name and recover from any party
liable thereon upon due proof of his ownership, the facts which prevent his
production of the instrument and its terms. The court may require security
indemnifying the defendant against loss by reason of further claims on the
instrument.
60. Section 3-504 states that presentment must be "by or on behalf of the holder."
Since § 1-201(20) makes possession a requirement of the holder status, the demand by
the owner of the instrument who is not in possession will not constitute presentment.
Moreover, § 3-505 gives the party to whom presentment is made the right to have the
instrument exhibited to him in order for an effective presentment to be accomplished.
61. See note 60 supra.
62. Section 3-413(1) provides: "The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as completed
pursuant to Section 3-115 on incomplete instruments."
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of a note is primarily liable, but the drawer and indorser of a check
are only secondarily liable-that is, a maker's liability arises either at
once (on a demand note) or with the passage of the due date (on a
note with a stated maturity), whereas the drawer's and indorser's
liability arises only after certain other conditions have been fulfilled.
More specifically, sections 3-413(2) and 3-41463 provide that the
drawer and prior indorser are liable to pay only "upon dishonor of
the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or presentment." Since
dishonor does not occur until presentment has been made or excused,
and since one cannot present unless he has possession of the instru-
ment, the payee who cannot regain possession of the stolen instru-
ment will not be able to fulfill the conditions precedent to making
the drawer and indorsers of a check "liable." Thus the drawer and
prior indorsers are not within the class against whom the owner's
cause of action in section 3-804 runs; they are not "parties liable
thereon."
A combination of the suspension of the underlying obligation
pursuant to section 3-802 and a literal reading of section 3-804 would
produce unfortunate and surely unintended results. It would mean,
for example, that a seller who had made a perfectly conforming per-
formance of his contractual obligations, and who had received but
lost the buyer's check, could never recover from the buyer-drawer.
If the buyer chose not to issue a second check, he would enjoy a
windfall equal to the value of the seller's performance. Irrespective
of any fault by the payee in losing the check, the drawer should be
made to pay once for conforming goods or services. The most that
the buyer can ask is to be suitably indemnified against the possibility
of having to pay a second time to a holder in due course of the lost
or stolen instrument.6 4
63. Section 3-413(2) provides: "The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft
and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to
the holder or to any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim this liability by
drawing without recourse."
Section 3-414(l) provides:
Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "without re-
course') every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of
dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the
time of his endorsement to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it
up, even though the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
64. If the stolen or lost instrument is a bearer instrument, it may get into the hands
of a holder in due course. Under § 3-305 the drawer would be obliged to pay this
holder in due course, despite the prior theft of the instrument. It is also possible that
a transferee from a thief of an order instrument could assert rights against the drawer
and cause him some expense in defending himself. In either event, it is appropriate
to place this expense on the person from whom the instrument was stolen in order to
encourage his future diligence in the safeguarding of checks and his early cashing of
them.
Section 3-804 authorizes a court to require such indemnification, and a deviation in
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A court can reach the appropriate result by several avenues under
the present language of the Code. The first and most direct route is
simply to read "liable" in section 3-804 so as to include secondary
parties. This produces an inconsistency between section 3-804 (sec-
ondary parties "liable" without dishonor or notice) and the drawer's
and indorser's contracts in sections 3-413 and 3-414 (secondary par-
ties "liable" only with dishonor and notice). This approach also
leaves open the questions whether one who sues the drawer or in-
dorser on a lost or stolen check but cannot accomplish a true present-
ment must nevertheless make a presentment-like demand for pay-
ment from the bank and, if the bank refuses to pay, whether and
when he must give notice of the bank's refusal. 65 It also raises the
question whether an indorser or drawer whose liability has been dis-
charged by the owner's delay in presentment prior to the loss or theft
is to be treated as a person "liable thereon." Still, the proposed solu-
tion is simple, and a court can likely resolve the confusion about the
need for and the necessary timing of the demand and notice.
A second, more subtle way to give the owner a right to sue on the
lost or stolen check under section 3-804 is to excuse presentment in
such situations. Section 3-511(2)(c) excuses presentment when "by
reasonable diligence" one cannot accomplish it,66 and, if presentment
is so excused, section 3-507 states that the instrument is deemed dis-
honored without presentment if payment is not made. 67 This read-
ing of sections 3-511 and 3-507 thus permits the payee or indorsee
owner to fulfill the conditions precedent to making the drawer liable
(dishonor and notice) despite the fact he does not have the instru-
ment in his possession. There are, however, several difficulties with
this approach. A minor problem is that the drafters probably did not
intend the excuse provisions of section 3-511 to be so used. Section
3-511(2)(c) is apparently designed to excuse presentment when the
§ 3-804 in California and New York directs the court to require such indemnification
in such cases. The rationale underlying such indemnification provisions is, of course,
that the drawer ought to have to pay the check once, but not more than once.
65. Except where it is excused (under § 3-511), § 3-501 requires presentment before
any secondary party is charged, and subsection (2) of § 3-501 requires notice of dishonor
before any indorser is charged. Unless excused, each of these must be given within
a reasonable time. In the case of an indorser, a reasonable time for presentment is
"seven days after his indorsement" (Q 3-503(2)(b)), and reasonable time for notice is
three business days "after dishonor or receipt of notice of dishonor." Failure of timely
presentment or notice discharges the indorser, but it has less serious consequences with
respect to the drawer, whom it discharges only in the case in which the drawee or payor
bank becomes insolvent during the delay (§ 3-502(1)(b)).
66. Section 3-511(2)(c) provides in part: "[B]y reasonable diligence the presentment
or protest cannot be made or the notice given."
67. Section 3-507(l)(b) states that an instrument is dishonored when "presentment
is excused and the instrument is not duly accepted or paid."
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presenter possesses the instrument but the payor is absent or insol-
vent, not when the owner lacks possession and the payor is present
and solvent.68 A more serious problem is that allowing suit by ex-
cusing presentment when it could not be made "by reasonable dili-
gence" invites a court to deny the owner's recovery on the lost instru-
ment when the check was lost or stolen as a result of his negligence.
In such cases a court might find presentment not excused because of
owner-plaintiff's lack of "reasonable diligence." As suggested above,
the maximum penalty which the owner should pay for his negligence
is that he be required to indemnify the drawer or indorser against
the possibility of a second demand for payment, and therefore the
presence or absence of the "reasonable diligence" of which section
3-511 speaks should not be of such crucial importance. The final ob-
jection to treating the owner under section 3-511 as though he has
presented is that such treatment will not only permit suit on the
stolen or lost instrument under section 3-804, but it will also resur-
rect the underlying obligation, since presentment, and therefore
presumably excuse of presentment, revives the underlying obligation
under section 3-802. Giving the payee a right to sue on the underlying
obligation is objectionable only because it may lead a court to permit
suit without appropriate indemnification. Section 3-802 contains no
authorization for the court to require such indemnification, whereas
section 3-804 permits it and, in two states,69 requires it. Indeed, some
courts might infer a legislative intent from the explicit directions in
section 3-804 that indemnification be required only in suits on the
lost instrument and not in those on the underlying obligation.
To prevent unjust enrichment of drawers and indorsers it is clear
that the payees and indorsees from whom instruments are stolen
should be able to recover from the drawer or prior indorsers. In pro-
viding for such recovery, the least ancillary difficulties are caused by
reading the language "persons liable thereon" in section 3-804 so as
to include drawers and indorsers. This reading allows the payee to
recover on the "lost or stolen instrument" provision despite the fact
that the drawer and indorser are not properly "liable" on the instru-
68. Nowhere do the Code or comments tell the specific reason for the excuse pro-
vision in § 3-511. However, that provision is a direct descendant of §§ 82, 112, & 159
of the NIL, which sections seem to have been designed to deal with cases like the
following: Clark v. O'Neal, 231 Ala. 577, 165 So. 853 (1936) (bank failed); Engle v.
Shepherd, 100 Okla. 200, 229 Pac. 208 (1924) (bank in the hands of state agent for wind-
ing up); Spencer v. Burakiewicz, 288 Mass. 83, 192 N.E. 616 (1934) (bank "closed');
Sunlite Co., Mfgrs. v. Justice, 257 S.W. 579 (rex. Civ. App. 1924) (corporation in
receivership and such was known by indorser-defendants in present action). See also
Llewellyn, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent in the Law
of Negotiable Paper, 23 COLUm. L. REv. 142, 154-55 (1923).
69. California and New York.
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ment prior to presentment and dishonor. I would suggest that a per-
manent solution to the problem would be the addition of such a pro-
vision to section 3-804.
IV. PRoPosED REVISIONS
It would be ungracious, perhaps even cowardly, to criticize the
design of Article Three without offering repairs and replacements
for similar criticisms by others. The following revisions do not trans-
form the Article Three machine into a Rolls Royce; they do, how-
ever, patch up the defects suggested above with the least interference
with the present structure of the Code and with minimum unpleas-
ant side-effects.
The "holder" ambiguities could be resolved as follows: Section
1-201 should read (new matter is italicized):
(20) "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document
of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, made or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank. A person
need not have acquired such possession by a voluntary transfer; a
thief may be a holder.
(47) "Indorsement." Only a holder or a person acting on his be-
half can "indorse" or make an "indorsement."
Section 3-407(2)(a) should read as follows:
(a) alteration which is both fraudulent and material by a holder who
acquired possession by delivery discharges any party whose con-
tract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded
from asserting the defense;7o
Section 3-417 should be redrafted as follows in order to alleviate
the ambiguities in the words "good title" and the difficulties raised
by the Wells Fargo case:
70. Apparently the Code drafters were convinced that the sanction of discharge was
necessary and desirable in order to inhibit alteration by holders. One can wonder
whether the cure is not more painful than the illness, and can question whether the
likelihood of a windfall under the present discharge rule is not greater than the
likelihood of any salutory inhibition on a would-be alterer. Perhaps the rule should
be changed to provide for no discharge even in the case of an alteration by a holder.
Professor Roy Steinheimer has suggested that § 3-407(2)(a) might be read to cause
discharge only as to the claims of the one who made the alteration. See SmINHEIMnR,
MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 92
(1960). This reading, which would substantially reduce the possibility of a windfall,
is based upon the drafters' use of the article "the" to modify "holder" in lieu of "a."
The difficulty with that reading is that it renders superfluous § 3-407(3) and the intro-
ductory phrase, "other than a subsequent holder in due course," of subsection (2).
The proposed redraft substitutes the article "a" for "the."
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Section 3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.
(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) none of the indorsements on the instrument is forged or
otherwise unauthorized; and
(b) he did not steal or otherwise misappropriate the instru-
ment or exceed his authority in presenting it; and
(c) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not
given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature;
or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signa-
ture, whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course
took the draft after the acceptance or obtained the
acceptance without knowledge that the drawer's sig-
nature was unauthorized; and
(d) except for the knowledge of such thefts or misappropria-
tions from which he is sheltered by an intervening trans-
feree under the provisions of Section 3-201, he took the
instrument without knowledge of any theft or misappro-
priation by persons through whom he traces his rights to
the instrument; and
(e) the instrument has not been materially altered except that
this warranty is not given by a holder in due course act-
ing in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note, or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is
also the drawee, or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an altera-
tion made after the acceptance.
but, the warranties in subsections (a) and (e) are not given by a trans-
feror who took the instrument for value and in good faith after accep-
tance to the acceptor of a draft with respect to any alteration or in-
dorsement made prior to such acceptance, even though the acceptance
provided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms.71
Language similar to that suggested as section 3-417(1)(a), (b), and (d)
should be incorporated in section 3-417(2) to replace the good title
statement. Revisions similar to those made in section 3-417 should
also be made in section 4-207.
The following repairs should be made to section 3-804:
71. The revision of § 3-417 goes slightly beyond the Wells Fargo case for it would
free a good faith taker of an accepted draft from liability not only in the alteration
case, but also in the case in which there had been a forgery of the payee or an in-
dorsee's name prior to acceptance. This seems a small extension of the bank's liability
and one which is consonant with the policy expressed in comment 5 to § 3-417.
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Section 3-804. Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instruments.
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the owner of an instrument
which is lost, whether by destruction, theft or otherwise, may main-
tain an action in his own name and recover from any party liable
thereon upon due proof of his ownership, the facts which prevent his
production of the instrument and its terms. The court may require
security indemnifying the defendant against loss by reason of further
claims on the instrument.
(2) Any party who is ordinarily not liable without presentment,
dishonor, protest, notice of protest, notice of dishonor, or a combina-
tion of the foregoing, shall nevertheless be deemed liable for the
purposes of subsection (1) when the owner has:
(a) made a written demand for payment on the person to
whom he would have presented the instrument for pay-
ment if he had possession of it; and
(b) such demand has been refused.
(8) Notwithstanding the owner's compliance with subsection (2),
no party whose liability was discharged under Section 3-502 because
of delay prior to theft or loss of the instrument shall be liable under
subsection (1).
V. CONCLUSION
The flaws here discussed fail the traditional test of significance,
for they have produced no appellate cases; a skilled judge can likely
operate the Article Three machine despite their presence. Moreover
a systematic investigation of commercial practices might reveal that
these ambiguities in fact have no significant impact upon those com-
mercial practices. Yet it is troublesome that the important concept
"holder" is not accurately defined, and it is disturbing to think that
an uninformed court might hold that a forger's transferee was a
holder in order to achieve the Wells Fargo result or that such a court
might deny a deserved recovery to the owner of a lost check. Since
these consequences can be avoided by a modest revision of a few sec-
tions, it is desirable that the repairs suggested above, or others like
them, be made to the Article Three machinery.
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